








After	 twenty	 years,	 the	 United	 States’	 longest-running	 military	
conflict	has	finally	drawn	to	a	close	with	the	withdrawal	of	U.S.	troops	
from	 Afghanistan.1	 	 The	 veterans	 who	 first	 deployed	 in	 support	 of	
combat	 operations	 in	 Afghanistan	 had	 to—literally	 in	 some	 cases—
hand	the	fighting	off	to	their	children.2		Those	veterans	now	look	to	the	
country	 that	 sent	 them	 into	 combat	 to	 provide	 them	 with	 care	 and	
compensation	 for	 the	wounds	 they	 incurred.	 	Two	hundred	 thousand	
veterans	of	the	post-9/11	era	are	now	leaving	the	military	each	year3	
and	many	 of	 them	will	 seek	 to	 access	 the	 host	 of	 veterans4	 benefits	
offered	 by	 various	 state	 and	 federal	 agencies—most	 notably	 those	
offered	by	the	U.S.	Department	of	Veterans	Affairs	(VA).		Some	of	those	
veterans	 will	 find	 little	 difficulty	 obtaining	 health	 care,	 housing,	
disability	 compensation,	 educational	 assistance,	 and	 a	 wide	 range	 of	
other	 benefits	 offered	 to	 them	 by	 the	 VA	 in	 thanks	 for	 their	 service.		
 
*	 J.D.	 Candidate,	 2022,	 Seton	 Hall	 University	 School	 of	 Law;	 M.A.	 The	 University	 of	
Oklahoma;	B.A.	Cedarville	University.		I	would	like	to	express	my	sincere	thanks	to	my	




Flights	 Depart,	 N.Y.	 TIMES	 (Aug.	 30,	 2021),	 https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/30/
world/asia/afghanistan-us-occupation-ends.html.	
	 2	 J.P.	Lawrence	&	Philip	W.	Wellman,	Years	After	They	Fought	 in	Afghanistan,	US	
Troops	Watch	 as	 Their	 Children	 Deploy	 to	 Same	War,	 STARS	&	STRIPES	 (Oct.	 7,	 2020),	
https://www.stripes.com/news/years-after-they-fought-in-afghanistan-us-troops-
watch-as-their-children-deploy-to-the-same-war-1.647659#.	
	 3	 U.S.	 GOV’T	 ACCOUNTABILITY	 OFF.,	 GAO-19-438R,	 TRANSITIONING	 SERVICEMEMBERS:	
INFORMATION	ON	MILITARY	EMPLOYMENT	ASSISTANCE	CENTERS	1	(2019),	https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-19-438r.pdf.	
	 4	 The	 use	 of	 the	 word	 “veterans”	 as	 an	 attributive	 noun—written	 without	 the	
apostrophe	that	would	typically	indicate	a	plural	possessive	noun—is	a	term	of	art	in	
the	field	of	veterans	benefits	which	this	Comment	will	employ	where	appropriate.		See,	




Some,	 however,	 will	 receive	 denial	 letters	 rejecting	 their	 claims	 for	
benefits	and	be	forced	to	wade	through	an	administrative	and	judicial	





VA	 estimates	 that	 there	 are	 now	 20.3	 million	 living	 veterans	 in	 the	
United	States.8		The	largest,	by	far,	of	the	many	VA-administered	benefits	



















BVA	2020	REPORT]	 (showing	 that	 in	 fiscal	 year	 2020,	 the	 Board	 of	 Veterans	Appeals	
granted	 33.8%	 of	 legacy	 appeals	 and	 remanded	 40.6%,	 and	 granted	 37.0%	 of	
modernized	 appeals	 and	 remanded	 28.2%);	 see	 also	 U.S.	CT.	 OF	APPEALS	 FOR	VETERANS	
CLAIMS,	 FISCAL	 YEAR	 2020	 ANNUAL	 REPORT	 3	 (2020),	 http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/




at	 the	 Board	 were	 unrepresented);	 see	 also	 CAVC	 2020	 REPORT,	 supra	 note	 6,	 at	 1	
(showing	that	twenty-three	percent	of	veterans	were	pro	se	at	the	time	of	filing	appeals	
and	twelve	percent	remained	pro	se	by	the	time	of	disposition).	













new	 claims	 by	 veterans	 seeking	 new	 or	 increased	 disability	








are	 responsible	 for	 adjudicatory	 functions	 suffer	 from	 similar	
challenges.15	 	 A	 handful	 of	 agencies	 have	 experimented	 with	
mechanisms	 that	 could	 speed	 up	 claim	 processing	 and	 improve	 the	
quality	and	consistency	of	adjudication	by	aggregating	similar	claims.16		
But	 the	 veterans	 claims	 adjudication	 system,	 like	 most	 of	 the	
administrative	 state,	 has	 historically	 resisted	 the	 implementation	 of	
“tools	used	by	courts	to	efficiently	resolve	large	groups	of	claims,	 like	
class	actions	and	other	complex	litigation	procedures.”17	



























disabling	 condition	 .	.	.	 must	 be	 considered	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 places,	 types	 and	











of	 those	burn	pits	and	medical	evidence	 linking	the	exposure	to	 their	
conditions.20	 	 Vietnam	 veterans	 spent	 years	 fighting	 the	 VA’s	 unfair	
regulatory	presumption	 that	every	veteran	who	physically	set	 foot	on	




in	 1989,	 veterans	were	 able	 to	 bring	 class-action	 lawsuits	 in	 federal	
district	 courts	 to	 challenge	 regulations	 or	 adjudicative	 policies	 that	















	 21	 See	 INSTITUTE	 OF	MEDICINE	 OF	 THE	NATIONAL	ACADEMIES,	BLUE	WATER	NAVY	VIETNAM	
VETERANS	AND	AGENT	ORANGE	EXPOSURE	1–2,	Nat’l	Acad.	Press	2011,	https://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/books/NBK209599/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK209599.pdf.		See	Section	III.A,	infra,	of	
this	 Comment	 for	 further	 discussion	 of	 Haas	 v.	 Nicholson,	 20	 Vet.	 App.	 257,	 259	
(2006),	rev’d	and	remanded	sub	nom.	Haas	v.	Peake,	525	F.3d	1168	(Fed.	Cir.	2008).	
	 22	 See,	e.g.,	Robison	v.	Johnson,	352	F.	Supp.	848,	851	(D.	Mass.	1973)	(certifying	a	
class	 of	 selective	 service	 registrants	 who	 had	 satisfactorily	 completed	 alternative	
civilian	 service	 and	 were	 denied	 veterans	 educational	 benefits),	rev’d,	415	 U.S.	 361	
(1974);	Wayne	State	Univ.	v.	Cleland,	440	F.	Supp.	811,	814	(E.D.	Mich.	1977)	(certifying	
a	class	of	veterans	enrolled	in	a	weekend	college	program	who	had	been	denied	full-








appellate	 court	 to	 render	 a	 binding,	 precedential	 decision	 to	 a	 single	
litigant	made	class	actions	unnecessary.24			
This	 Comment	 will	 examine	 the	 CAVC’s	 long-held	 view	 of	 itself	
primarily	 as	 an	 appellate	 court	 akin	 to	 the	 federal	 circuit	 courts	 of	
appeal	 that	 issue	 precedential	 decisions.	 	 It	will	 then	 show	how	 that	
view	 has	 led	 to	 the	 development	 and	 codification	 of	 a	 rebuttable	
presumption	 against	 certifying	 class	 actions	 based	 on	 the	 flawed	
assumption	 that	 the	 court’s	 ability	 to	 issue	 a	 precedential	 decision	
makes	class	actions	unnecessary.		Finally,	this	Comment	will	argue	that	
the	 presumption	 against	 the	 certification	 of	 class	 actions	 should	 be	
abandoned.	 	 Part	 II	 will	 explain	 how	 veterans	 benefits	 claims	 are	
litigated	 through	 the	 administrative	 agency	 process	 and	 explore	 the	
factors	that	led	to	the	creation	of	the	CAVC	as	a	level	of	judicial	review	
over	veterans’	claims.		Part	III	will	trace	the	CAVC’s	repeated	rejections	
of	 requests	 for	 class	 action	 certification	 from	 the	 time	 the	 court	was	
created	by	the	VJRA	in	1989	through	the	decision	by	the	Federal	Circuit	
in	 2017	which	 held	 that	 the	 CAVC	must	 entertain	 requests	 to	 certify	
class	actions.		It	will	also	examine	how	the	CAVC	reacted	to	the	Federal	
Circuit’s	decision	by	adopting	the	rebuttable	presumption	against	class	
action	 certification.	 	 Part	V	will	 show	 that	 the	CAVC’s	 ability	 to	 issue	
precedential	decisions	is	nominal	at	best	and	complicated	by	numerous	












for	Veterans	Claims,	 ADMIN.	&	REG.	L.	NEWS	 4	 (“The	 court	has	 exclusive	 jurisdiction	 to	
review	decisions	of	the	Board	of	Veterans’	Appeals.”).	

















agency.31	 	 In	 1989,	 succumbing	 to	 pressure	 from	numerous	 veterans	
groups,	 Congress	 passed	 the	 Veterans	 Judicial	 Review	 Act,	 which	
created	 the	U.S.	 Court	 of	 Appeals	 for	 Veterans	 Claims	 (CAVC).32	 	 The	
CAVC	is	an	Article	I	court33	with	the	jurisdiction	to	review	final	decisions	
 
	 25	 See	 How	 to	 File	 a	 VA	 Disability	 Claim,	 U.S.	 DEP’T	 OF	 VETERANS	 AFFS.,	
https://www.va.gov/disability/how-to-file-claim/	(last	visited	Oct.	8,	2021).		Veterans	
can	also	seek	the	assistance	of	an	accredited	service	organization	for	assistance	with	
filing	 their	 claim.	 	Get	 Help	 Filing	 Your	 Claim	 or	 Appeal,	 U.S.	DEP’T	 OF	VETERANS	AFFS.,	
https://www.va.gov/disability/get-help-filing-claim/	(last	visited	Oct.	8,	2021).	









	 30	 Before	 the	 VA	 was	 created	 in	 1921,	 veterans	 benefits	 were	 administered,	 at	



























affirming,	 denying,	 or	modifying	 the	 agency’s	 decision,	 or	 remanding	
























to	 screen	 for	 cases	 appropriate	 for	 panel	 disposition);	 see	 also	 Internal	 Operating	



















precedential	 review	 where	 it	 may	 be	 desirable.	 	 Ultimately,	
approximately	 ninety-nine	 percent	 of	 cases	 at	 the	 CAVC	 that	 reach	 a	






single-judge	 decisions	 only	 affect	 the	 veteran	 before	 the	 court,	 the	
judges	who	issue	them	often	do	not	go	to	great	lengths	to	explain	the	
law	being	applied.47		The	same	“screening	judge”	who	determines	that	




remands,	both	at	 the	agency	 level	 and	at	 the	CAVC,	 along	with	 short,	
thinly-reasoned	opinions	 that	 do	not	 bind	 the	VA	 in	 any	other	 cases,	
places	veterans	as	a	community	in	a	“hamster	wheel”	of	adjudications.51		
 










	 49	 See	 Frankel	 v.	 Derwinski,	 1	 Vet.	 App.	 23,	 26	 (1990)	 (noting	 that	 one	 of	 the	
advantages	of	the	screening	process	is	that	it	“make[s]	it	possible	to	treat	a	considerable	
number	 of	 cases	 without	 full	 briefing	 and	 oral	 argument”);	 see	 also	 CAVC	 Internal	
Operating	Procedures,	supra	note	40,	at	2	(“A	request	for	oral	argument	generally	is	not	
granted	for	cases	deemed	appropriate	for	single-judge	disposition.”).		











to	 describe	 the	 plight	 of	 individual	 veterans	who	 get	 stuck	 litigating	
their	claims	through	the	system.52		But	when	entire	groups	of	similarly	




A	 panel’s	 precedential	 decision	 does,	 in	 theory,	 bind	 the	 VA,	





their	 best	 interests	 without	 counsel.54	 	 Represented	 veterans	 with	
meritorious	 legal	 positions,	 which	 may	 have	 led	 to	 a	 precedential	
decision,	 may	 instead	 resolve	 their	 dispute	 with	 the	 VA	 at	 the	 pre-
disposition	 conference,	 whereas	 a	 pro	 se	 veteran	 generally	 does	 not	
have	the	opportunity	to	do	so.55	 	The	VA	also	frequently	endeavors	to	





(“The	 procedure	 for	 claiming	 and	 appealing	 benefits	 has	 been	 likened	 to	 a	 hamster	




veterans	 were	 pro	 se	 at	 the	 time	 of	 filing	 appeals	 and	 twelve	 percent	 of	 appeals	
remained	pro	se	by	the	time	of	disposition);	see	also	Lawrence	B.	Hagel	&	Michael	P.	
Horan,	Five	Years	Under	the	Veterans’	Judicial	Review	Act:	The	VA	Is	Brought	Kicking	and	



















began	 to	propose	 that	 the	CAVC	adopt	a	mechanism	that	 is	expressly	
designed	to	benefit	large	groups	of	claimants	who	are	similarly	situated	
and	 may	 face	 difficulty	 litigating	 their	 claim	 individually—the	 class	
action.58	 	 The	 class	 action	mechanism	has	 several	key	 features	which	
make	it	an	attractive	option	for	adjudicating	large	volumes	of	claims.59		
First,	 it	 can	 improve	 the	 likelihood	 that	 claimants	 are	 able	 to	 be	
represented	 by	 competent	 counsel	 because	 a	 large	 class	 action	 may	
attract	attorneys	willing	 to	represent	 the	class	where	a	 lone	claimant	
could	not	 afford	 to	 retain	 counsel.60	 	 Second,	 class	 actions	 encourage	
more	efficient	adjudication	of	claims,	particularly	when	those	claims	are	
factually	 and	 legally	 similar.61	 	 Finally,	 class	 action	 adjudication	




its	 existence,	 reasoning	 that	 entertaining	 class	 actions	 would	 be	 a	
violation	of	the	court’s	jurisdictional	statutes,63	as	well	as	inappropriate	





















App.	 May	 27,	 2015)	 (“[The	 appellant]	 fails	 to	 appreciate	 the	 Court’s	 long-standing	
declaration	 that	 it	does	not	have	 the	authority	 to	entertain	 class	actions.”),	rev’d	and	
remanded	sub	nom.	Monk	v.	Shulkin,	855	F.3d	1312	(Fed.	Cir.	2017).	










Circuit	 overturned	nearly	 three	 decades	 of	 CAVC	precedent	 and	 held	
that	 the	CAVC	did	have	 the	authority	 to	entertain	class	actions	 in	 the	










cases	where	 a	 claimant	 requested	 class	 certification	 arising	 from	 the	
appeal	of	an	individual	benefits	decision	following	Monk	II—the	CAVC	
went	 beyond	 the	 traditional	 requirements	 of	 Rule	 23	 of	 the	 Federal	
Rules	of	Civil	Procedure	(“Rule	23”).70		The	court	held	that	all	litigants	
must	 also	 overcome	 a	 rebuttable	 presumption	 that	 a	 precedential	




The	 CAVC	 based	 its	 decision	 to	 add	 a	 rebuttable	 presumption	





















part	 of	 the	 VA	 to	 adhere	 to	 the	 court’s	 decisions.	 	 The	 presumption	
against	the	certification	of	class	actions	also	puts	the	CAVC	out	of	step	




class	actions	 in	 federal	district	courts	against	 the	VA	for	 the	denial	of	





single	 dioxin-related	 skin	 condition—chloracne—as	 compensable.75		
The	district	 court	 recognized	 that	 the	only	 relevant	considerations	 in	
determining	whether	to	certify	a	class	were	the	requirements	of	Rule	
23.76		The	court	found	that	the	requirements	were	met	and	certified	the	
class.77	 	 Considering	 cross-motions	 for	 summary	 judgment,	 the	 court	
ultimately	 invalidated	 the	 regulation	 and	 placed	 a	 moratorium	 on	
further	denials.78		The	parties	reached	a	stipulated	settlement	as	a	result	
of	 the	 litigation	 that	 was	 eventually	 codified	 in	 VA	 regulations	 and	
remains	a	part	of	VA	claims	adjudication	guidance	to	this	day.79		





class	 of	 selective	 service	 registrants	 who	 had	 satisfactorily	 completed	 alternative	
civilian	 service	 and	 were	 denied	 veterans	 educational	 benefits),	rev’d,	415	 U.S.	 361	
(1974);	Wayne	State	Univ.	v.	Cleland,	440	F.	Supp.	811,	814	(E.D.	Mich.	1977)	(certifying	
a	class	of	veterans	enrolled	in	a	weekend	college	program	who	had	been	denied	full-
time	 educational	 benefits),	aff’d	 in	 part,	 rev’d	 in	 part,	590	 F.2d	 627	 (6th	 Cir.	 1978);	








	 80	 See	 Legislative	 Hearing	 on	 H.R.	 761,	 H.R.	 2243,	 H.R.	 3485,	 H.R.	 3544,	 and	 Draft	
Legislation	Before	the	H.	Subcomm.	on	Disability	Assistance	and	Mem’l	Affs.	of	the	Comm.	
on	 Veterans’	 Affs.,	 111th	 Cong.	 47	 (2009)	 (statement	 of	 Barton	 F.	 Stichman,	 Joint	
Executive	 Director,	 National	 Veterans	 Legal	 Services	 Program)	 (“[T]he	 ability	 of	 a	










and	 how	 its	 pre-Monk	 II	 jurisprudence	 would	 be	 impacted	 by	 the	
Federal	Circuit’s	decision.		Section	A	below	will	explore	the	development	
of	 the	 CAVC’s	 stance	 towards	 class	 actions	 in	 the	 Pre-Monk	 II	 era.		
Section	 B	 will	 explore	 the	 landmark	Monk	 II	 decision,	 and	 how	 the	
Federal	Circuit’s	reasoning	began	to	reshape	the	class	action	landscape	
at	 the	 CAVC.	 	 Section	 C	will	 examine	 the	 CAVC’s	 decision	 in	 Skaar	 v.	






time,	 it	 was	 not	 clear	 whether	 Congress—in	 conferring	 exclusive	
jurisdiction	over	veterans	claims	on	the	CAVC—intended	for	veterans	to	
be	able	to	continue	to	bring	class	actions	before	the	CAVC	as	they	had	
previously	 in	 federal	 district	 courts.81	 	 The	 CAVC	 had	 to	 determine	
whether	 Congress	 intended	 to	 grant	 it	 such	 authority;	 in	 two	 short,	






















“lack[ed]	 the	 power	 to	 adopt	 a	 rule”	 for	 class	 actions	 because	 it	was	
limited	 to	 hearing	 only	 appeals	 from	 individual	 veterans	 who	 had	
received	a	final	BVA	decision	and	filed	a	notice	of	appeal	where	the	court	
could	rule	on	the	closed	administrative	record.87	
The	 opinions	 also	 stated,	 without	 any	 elaboration,	 that	 a	 class	












may	 have	 the	 power	 to	 entertain	 class	 actions”	 under	 the	 AWA	 “in	
appropriate	situations,”	but	did	not	indicate	what	those	situations	might	
be.92		
The	 CAVC	next	 addressed	 the	 scope	 of	 its	 jurisdictional	 statutes	
and	whether	there	were	any	avenues	for	claim	aggregation	in	American	
Legion	 v.	 Nicholson.93	 	 Although	 the	 plaintiff	 was	 not	 explicitly	
attempting	 to	certify	a	class	action,	 the	court	 took	 the	opportunity	 to	
more	 fully	 explain	 the	 view	 that	 its	 jurisdictional	 statutes	 strictly	
confined	 it	 to	 hearing	 only	 individual	 appeals.94	 	 Judge	 Hagel	 would	








writs	 necessary	 or	 appropriate	 in	 aid	 of	 their	 respective	 jurisdictions.”	 	 28	 U.S.C.	 §	














dissuaded	 by	 the	 existing	 precedent	 on	 class	 actions,	 the	 American	
Legion	instead	argued	that	it	had	associational	standing	on	behalf	of	all	
the	 blue	 water	 Vietnam	 veterans	 and	 asked	 the	 CAVC	 for	 a	 writ	 of	
mandamus	 to	 resume	 VA	 processing	 of	 blue	 water	 herbicide	 claims	
pending	the	resolution	of	the	appeal	of	Haas	v.	Nicholson.98		
In	Haas,	an	individual	Vietnam	veteran	had	appealed	a	decision	by	





had	 actually	 been	 exposed	 to	 Agent	 Orange.100	 	 A	 three-judge	 panel	
heard	Haas	and	concluded	that	the	VA’s	interpretation	of	the	regulation	




benefits	 for	 the	 injuries	 they	 suffered	as	 a	 result	 of	being	exposed	 to	




	 96	 A	 “blue	water”	 veteran	 is	 a	 servicemember	who	 served	 on	 a	 ship	 in	 the	 open	
waters	surrounding	Vietnam	but	did	not	set	foot	on	shore.		See	Blue	Water	Navy	Veterans	
and	Agent	Orange	Exposure,	U.S.	DEP’T	OF	VETERANS	AFFS.,	https://www.publichealth.va.







purpose;	 and	 (c)	 neither	 the	 claim	 asserted	 nor	 the	 relief	 requested	 requires	 the	
participation	of	 individual	members	 in	the	 lawsuit.”	 	Hunt	v.	Washington	State	Apple	
Advert.	Comm’n,	432	U.S.	333,	343	(1977).	


















To	 allow	 these	 veterans	 to	 benefit	 from	Mr.	 Haas’s	win	 and	 the	
precedential	decision	issued	by	the	CAVC,	the	American	Legion	sought	a	
writ	 of	 mandamus	 directing	 the	 VA	 to	 resume	 processing	 claims	 in	
accordance	with	 the	Haas	 decision.106	 	 Perhaps	 seeing	 an	 alternative	
avenue	 in	 Judge	 Kramer’s	 dissents	 in	 Harrison	 and	 Lefkowitz,	 the	
American	Legion	also	argued	that	the	CAVC	had	jurisdiction	to	hear	its	
associational	claim	on	behalf	of	its	members,	pursuant	to	the	AWA.107		
Judge	 Greene	 wrote	 the	 majority	 opinion,	 joined	 by	 Judges	
Moorman,	Lance,	and	Davis.108	 	The	court	concluded	 that	38	U.S.C.	§§	
7252(a)	 and	 7266(a)	 limited	 its	 jurisdiction	 to	 decisions	 of	 the	 BVA	






VA.110	 	 In	 the	 majority’s	 view,	 the	 proper	 role	 of	 Veterans	 Service	
Organizations	 like	 the	 American	 Legion	 should	 be	 representing	 and	
























possesses	 independent	 authority	 under	 the	 AWA	 to	 grant	
“extraordinary	 relief”	 in	 aid	 of	 that	 jurisdiction.115	 	 Judge	Kasold	 also	
took	the	position	that	the	legislative	history	cited	by	the	majority	was	








that	 “very	 limited	 circumstances	 .	.	.	 would	 support”	 associational	
standing.118		
During	 the	 same	 period	 that	 the	 court	 was	 rendering	 these	
decisions—holding	 that	 its	 authorizing	 statute	 prevented	 it	 from	
entertaining	class	actions	and	associational	standing	claims—the	court	
was	also	actively	resisting	legislative	reforms	that	would	have	amended	
the	 VJRA	 to	 grant	 it	 such	 authority.	 	 The	 Veterans	 Appellate	 Review	
Modernization	Act	was	draft	 legislation	proposed	 in	2009	that	would	
have,	among	other	things,	explicitly	granted	the	CAVC	the	jurisdiction	to	
entertain	 class	 actions	 and	 adopted	 Rule	 23	 as	 the	 framework	 for	
certification.119		Judge	Kasold	appeared	at	committee	hearings	on	the	bill	










	 119	 Legislative	 Hearing	 on	 H.R.	 761,	 H.R.	 2243,	 H.R.	 3485,	 H.R.	 3544,	 and	 Draft	
Legislation	Before	the	H.	Subcomm.	on	Disability	Assistance	and	Mem’l	Affairs	of	the	Comm.	









they	were,	 as	 a	 rule,	 beyond	 the	 court’s	 authority.121	 	 Ultimately	 the	
grant	of	class	action	authority	was	dropped	from	the	final	version	of	the	
legislation.122	
In	 2011,	 the	 now-Chief	 Judge	 Kasold	 appeared	 before	 the	
committee	 again	 and	 opposed	 certain	 provisions	 of	 H.R.	 1484,	 the	
Veterans	Appeals	Improvement	Act	of	2011,	arguing	that	class	actions	
were	 not	 needed	 due	 to	 the	 court’s	 ability	 to	 issue	 precedential	





if	 an	 individual	 veteran	 secured	 a	 win	 on	 a	 particular	 issue,	 the	 VA	














as	 including	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 commission,	 a	 grant	 of	 class	 action	 authority,	 and	
provisions	 on	 the	 assignments	 of	 error),	 with	 Veterans	 Appeals	 Improvement	 and	
Modernization	Act	of	2009,	H.R.	4121,	111th	Cong.	§§	3,	4	(2009)	(incorporating	the	
provisions	on	assignment	of	error	and	the	creation	of	a	commission).	
	 123	 Legislative	Hearing	on	H.R.	 811,	H.R.	 1407,	H.R.	 1441,	H.R.	 1484,	H.R.	 1627,	H.R.	
1647,	and	H.	Con.	Res.	12	Before	the	H.	Subcomm.	on	Disability	Assistance	and	Mem’l	Affairs	
of	the	Comm.	on	Veterans’	Affairs,	112th	Cong.	19–21	(2011).	
	 124	 Veterans	 Appeals	 Improvement	 Act	 of	 2011,	 H.R.	 1484,	 112th	 Cong.	 §3	 (as	
introduced	in	the	House,	Apr.	12,	2011).	
	 125	 Legislative	Hearing	on	H.R.	 811,	H.R.	 1407,	H.R.	 1441,	H.R.	 1484,	H.R.	 1627,	H.R.	
1647,	and	H.	Con.	Res.	12	Before	the	H.	Subcomm.	on	Disability	Assistance	and	Mem’l	Affairs	
of	the	Comm.	on	Veterans’	Affairs,	112th	Cong.	21	(2011).	






mandamus	 before	 the	 CAVC	 challenging	 the	 VA’s	 “pervasive	 and	
unlawful	 delay[s]	 in	 adjudicating”	 the	 appeals	 of	 disability	 benefits	
claims.128		Mr.	Monk	had	filed	a	claim	for	benefits	that	was	denied,	and	
he	appealed	the	denial	of	that	claim	to	the	BVA	in	July	of	2013.129		At	the	
time	of	his	petition	 to	 the	CAVC	 in	May	of	2015,	his	appeal	had	been	






Mr.	 Monk’s	 petition	 recognized	 that	 the	 CAVC	 had	 previously	
declined	to	adopt	class	action	or	aggregate	procedures.133		He	took	the	
position	 that	 the	 court	 possessed	 the	 authority	 under	 the	 AWA	 to	
establish	 a	 class	 action	 procedure.134	 	 Mr.	 Monk	 argued	 that,	 “[f]or	
practical	 and	 policy	 reasons,”	 the	 court	 should	 use	 its	 inherent	
rulemaking	authority	to	create	a	class	action	mechanism.135		He	cited	a	







binding	 precedent	 established	 by	 the	 en	 banc	 court	 in	 Lefkowitz,	
Harrison,	and	American	Legion.138		In	the	face	of	that	binding	precedent,	
Judge	Hagel	concluded	that	the	CAVC	lacked	the	authority	to	certify	a	
























Circuit	 had	 previously	 seemed	 to	 agree—or	 at	 least	 declined	 to	










bring	 class	 actions	 prior	 to	 the	 VJRA	 and	 noted	 that—although	 the	
legislative	history	indicated	an	intent	for	the	CAVC	to	focus	on	individual	




Judge	 Reyna	 then	 examined	 the	 CAVC’s	 narrow	 reading	 of	 its	
jurisdictional	statutes,	which	it	first	applied	in	Lefkowitz	and	Harrison,	
and	 concluded	 that	 such	 a	 strict	 interpretation	 of	 the	 statutes	 was	
misguided.144	 	 The	 Federal	 Circuit	 reminded	 the	 CAVC	 that	 its	
overarching	 statutory	 mandate	 codified	 in	 the	 VJRA	 was	 to	 “compel	
action	of	the	Secretary	unlawfully	withheld	or	unreasonably	delayed.”145		
It	reasoned	that	this	explicit	grant	of	authority	to	compel	such	action,	
and	 the	 attendant	 authority	 to	 “prescribe	 rules	 of	 practice	 and	
















The	 Federal	 Circuit	 also	 validated	 Judge	 Kassold’s	 dissent	 in	
American	Legion	by	clarifying	that	the	CAVC’s	authority	under	the	AWA	
is	 not	 limited	 to	 the	 strict	 jurisdictional	 boundaries	 that	 apply	 to	
individual	appeals	but	is	a	“legislatively	approved	.	.	.	instrument[]”	that	
broadly	 empowers	 the	 CAVC	 to	 achieve	 equity	 and	 “fill	 gaps	 in	 their	
judicial	power.”147	
Judge	 Reyna	 also	 highlighted	 a	 number	 of	 compelling	 policy	
rationales	for	the	adoption	of	a	class	action	mechanism	at	the	CAVC	and	
why	 such	 a	 procedure	would	 “promot[e]	 efficiency,	 consistency,	 and	
fairness,	and	improv[e]	access	to	legal	and	expert	assistance	by	parties	
with	 limited	resources.”148	 	First,	 Judge	Reyna	noted	 that	 “case	 law	 is	
replete”	with	examples	of	the	VA	dodging	the	effect	of	judicial	review	by	
acting	 swiftly	 to	moot	 individual	mandamus	petitions	 just	 before	 the	
CAVC	could	rule	on	them	and	reasoned	that	a	class	action	mechanism	
would	help	put	an	end	to	this	practice.149		Judge	Reyna	also	pointed	out	









group	of	 former	General	Counsels	 for	 the	VA	argued	that	“the	CAVC’s	


























respect	 from,	 for	 example,	 the	 EEOC	 or	 bankruptcy	 courts.”155	 	 This	













applied	 the	 well-known	 factors	 of	 Rule	 23(a)—numerosity,	
commonality,	 typicality,	 and	 adequacy—and	 the	 requirement	 that	 a	







the	 EEOC	 are	 conducted	 through	 an	 internal	 agency	 process	 and	 adjudicated	 by	
administrative	judges.		29	C.F.R.	§	1614.204	(2020).		An	amicus	brief	filed	by	fifteen	law	
professors	pointed	out	to	the	Federal	Circuit	that	many	other	Article	I	“administrative	
courts	 of	 appeal”	 use	methods	 of	 case	 aggregation	 to	 consolidate	 cases,	 such	 as	 the	
“Civilian	 Board	 of	 Contract	 Appeals,	 the	 HHS	 Departmental	 Appeals	 Board,	 the	
Department	of	Agriculture,	OMHA,	and	the	Environmental	Appeals	Board.”		Corrected	


















add	 an	 additional	 presumption	 against	 class	 actions,	 and	 Judge	Allen	
even	took	time	in	a	concurrence	to	commend	the	plurality’s	adoption	of	
the	Rule	23	framework	as	“wise[]”	given	its	“long	history	in	the	Federal	
courts.”162	 	 Judge	 Allen	 also	 made	 a	 point	 to	 remind	 the	 court	 that	
although	individual	precedential	decisions	bind	the	VA,	they	are	small	
in	number	and	difficult	for	individual	claimants	to	enforce.163			
After	 Monk	 II,	 the	 notion	 that	 precedential	 decisions	 make	
certification	 of	 class	 actions	 unnecessary	 began	 to	 resurface	 in	 the	
CAVC’s	response	to	two	motions	for	class	certification	decided	in	2019:	
Godsey	v.	Wilkie	and	Wolfe	v.	Wilkie.164		In	both	cases,	after	evaluating	the	
proposed	 classes	 under	 the	 standard	 Rule	 23(a)	 factors,	 the	 court	
elected	 to	 evaluate	 the	 “superiority”	 of	 a	 class	 action	 in	 a	 manner	
analogous	to	a	23(b)(3)	claim,	despite	acknowledging	that	the	parties	
were	 seeking	 the	 certification	 of	what	would	 normally	 be	 a	 23(b)(2)	
class.165	 	 Both	 decisions	 acknowledged	 the	 burden	 of	 obtaining	 and	
enforcing	 individual	 precedential	 decisions.166	 	 But	 by	 electing	 to	 go	
through	the	analysis	of	superiority	where	Rule	23	would	not	ordinarily	
require	 it,	 the	 court	 began	 to	 resurrect	 the	 fundamental	 assumption	
from	Harrison	and	Lefkowitz	that	the	question	of	class	certification	must	
begin	 with	 the	 assumption	 that	 a	 precedential	 panel	 decision	 is	

























impacted	 the	 ground	 at	 high	 speed,	 causing	 them	 to	 explode	 in	 sub-
nuclear	 detonations	 that	 scattered	 radioactive	 plutonium	 across	 the	
Spanish	 countryside.169	 	 Approximately	 1,600	 U.S.	 servicemembers—
most	 low-ranking	Air	Force	personnel	with	no	specialized	 training	 in	
radioactive	cleanup—were	sent	to	clean	up	the	debris	with	little	to	no	
protective	gear,	each	spending	anywhere	from	several	weeks	to	several	
months	exposed	 to	 the	plutonium.170	 	Many	of	 these	 servicemembers	
developed	 cancers,	 blood	 disorders,	 cardiovascular	 conditions,	 and	
other	 diseases,	 but	 the	 VA	 denied	 their	 applications	 for	 disability	
compensation.171	 	 The	Air	 Force	had	 collected	data	on	 the	plutonium	
levels	at	the	cleanup	site,	but	the	VA	decided	to	discard	that	data	because	
it	 showed	 levels	 of	 exposure	 that	 the	 VA	 assumed	 were	 inaccurate	
because	 they	were	 so	 high.172	 	 Then,	 after	 having	 discarded	 the	 data	
showing	 levels	 of	 exposure	 that	 would	 have	 substantiated	 the	
Palomares	veterans’	claims,	the	VA	denied	them	disability	benefits.173	
One	of	the	Air	Force	veterans	who	spent	years	litigating	his	claim	
for	 benefits	 through	 the	 VA	 brought	 a	 petition	 to	 the	 CAVC	 for	 class	
certification	on	behalf	of	the	Palomares	veterans.174		Although	the	CAVC	
had	 recently	 granted	 class	 action	 certifications	 in	 the	 context	 of	
petitions	for	a	writ	of	mandamus	in	Wolfe	and	Godsey,	this	was	the	first	
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	 172	 Id.;	 see	 also	 Skaar,	 32	 Vet.	 App.	 at	 169	 (“[R]ecorded	 urine	 dose	 intakes	 for	











for	 class	 certification	and	 concluded	 that	 the	petition	 satisfied	all	 the	
requirements	of	Rule	23(a)	and	23(b)(2).177	 	 It	then	went	on	to	add	a	
rebuttable	presumption	against	certifying	class	actions.178		Writing	for	











comparison	 of	 the	CAVC	 to	 the	EEOC	 and	bankruptcy	 courts	 and	 the	




not	 see	 itself	 as	 akin	 to	 an	 administrative	 agency	 appeals	 board	or	 a	




	 176	 Id.	at	200–01.	 	Notably,	 the	VA	has	appealed	the	class	certification	decisions	 in	



















The	 Skaar	 decision	 established	 four	 factors	 that	 claimants	 can	
demonstrate	 to	 rebut	 the	 presumption	 against	 certifying	 class	
actions.184		The	presumption	can	be	overcome	by	showing	that	(1)	the	
claims	 are	 directed	 at	 the	 policy	 itself;	 (2)	 litigation	 of	 the	 challenge	
involves	 compiling	 a	 complex	 factual	 record;	 (3)	 the	 record	 is	
sufficiently	 complete	 for	 adjudication;	 and	 (4)	 there	 is	 a	 need	 for	
remedial,	class-wide	enforcement.185		A	full	discussion	of	the	merits	of	
each	of	these	factors	would	exceed	the	scope	of	this	Comment	and	would	





single	 judges	disposing	of	 the	claims	of	 individual	 litigants	as	quickly	
and	efficiently	as	possible.	
In	 crafting	 these	 factors,	 the	 court	 did	 identify	 some	 practical	
limitations	that	can	make	class	actions	difficult	to	manage	and	that,	in	
certain	 cases,	 “render	 the	 class	 action	 format	 inappropriate	 for	 a	
particular	suit.”186		Judge	Allen	pointed	to	decisions	where	class	actions	
were	held	to	be	unmanageable	because	(1)	individual	class	members’	
claims	 were	 governed	 by	 disparate	 sets	 of	 state	 laws,	 (2)	
communicating	with	a	large	class	and	providing	the	required	notice	and	
opt-out	rights	was	too	difficult,	and	(3)	the	claims	of	the	class	members	
“required	 too	 many	 individualized	 determinations.”187	 	 These	
manageability	 concerns	 present	 in	 other	 federal	 courts	 are	 largely	
inapplicable	at	the	CAVC,	particularly	once	the	requirements	of	Rule	23	
have	 been	 met.	 	 Federal	 statutes	 and	 regulations	 govern	 all	 claims	




of	 the	 class	 representative.188	 	 The	 VA	 is	 also	 uniquely	 positioned	 to	
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The	 CAVC	 has	 rendered	 relatively	 few	 decisions	 on	 class	
certification	since	it	formally	implemented	the	rebuttable	presumption	
in	Skaar,190	so	it	remains	to	be	seen	how	difficult	it	will	be	for	claimants	
to	use	 the	 four	 factors	 to	 rebut	 the	presumption	against	 certification.		
Some	of	 the	decisions	 that	have	been	rendered,	however,	are	already	
demonstrating	 the	 court’s	 propensity	 to	 summarily	 reject	 class	
certification	 based	 on	 their	 long-standing	 assumption	 that	 their	
precedential	 decisions	 are	 an	 available	 and	 enforceable	 remedy	 for	
most	veterans.191	 	 In	a	recent	decision	on	two	consolidated	cases,	 the	
court	rejected	both	veterans’	claims	on	the	merits	but	also	elected,	in	the	
alternative,	to	deny	their	motions	for	class	certification.192		Writing	for	
the	 panel,	 Chief	 Judge	 Bartley	 stated	 that	 the	 claimants	 had	 not	
demonstrated	 that	 there	 was	 “a	 need	 for	 remedial	 enforcement	 .	.	.	
because	a	binding	precedential	decision	would	be	adequate	to	provide	
relief	to	any	valid	prospective	class	members.”193		The	court	presumed	
that	 if	 the	claimants	were	successful	 in	challenging	the	validity	of	 the	
regulation	 at	 issue,	 the	 VA	 would	 “immediately	 implement	 [that]	
precedential	decision,”	and	 Judge	Bartley	dismissed	any	possibility	of	
VA	non-compliance	as	“hypothetical”	and	“unlikely.”194		
The	CAVC	recently	granted	class	 certification	 for	only	 the	 fourth	
time	in	its	history195	 in	Beaudette	v.	McDonough.196	 	The	petitioners	in	
Beaudette	 challenged	 the	 VA’s	 interpretation	 of	 38	U.S.C.	 §	 1720G	 as	
 
that	 the	 VA	 maintains	 the	 “largest	 integrated	 healthcare	 system”	 database	 in	 the	
country,	with	20	years	of	data	on	9	million	veterans).		Federal	records	custodians	also	
maintain	the	last	known	home	address	of	every	single	veteran	upon	separation	from	the	














	 195	 The	CAVC	has	previously	certified	classes	 in	Godsey	v.	Wilkie,	31	Vet.	App.	207	








held	 that	 the	 “unique	 circumstances	 [of	 the]	 case	 warrant[ed]	 class-
wide	 relief.”199	 	 Because	 the	 VA	 had	 denied	 claimants	 any	 form	 of	
meaningful	 appellate	 review	 for	 so	 long,	 the	 CAVC	 reasoned	 that	 the	
“centralized	relief”	afforded	by	a	class	action	was	necessary	to	remedy	
the	 issue.200	 	 The	 CAVC	briefly	 analyzed	 each	 of	 the	 first	 three	Skaar	
factors,	noting	that	none	are	“more	or	less	important	than	the	others.”201		
Then,	the	court	spent	the	bulk	of	 its	Skaar	analysis	on	the	final	factor	
stating	 that	 “[m]ost	 importantly	 .	.	.	 a	precedential	decision	would	not	
effectively	 inform	past	program	claimants	of	 their	 appellate	 rights	or	
ensure	that	VA	honored	them.”202	
In	 the	 future,	 the	 CAVC	 may	 apply	 one	 of	 the	 first	 three	 Skaar	
factors	 to	 reject	 class	 actions	due	 to	more	practical	 concerns	 such	as	
complexity	or	 the	 lack	of	 a	well-developed	 record.203	 	But	 the	 court’s	
class	 action	 jurisprudence	 up	 to	 this	 point,	 and	 its	 early	 decisions	
applying	the	rebuttable	presumption	against	certification,	indicate	that	
its	 primary	 focus	 remains	 centered	 on	 using	 the	 fourth	 factor—the	
enforcement	factor—to	determine	whether	its	nominal	ability	to	render	






that	 the	 alternative	 to	 certification	 of	 a	 class	 action	 is	 a	 precedential	
decision.		Practically,	the	odds	are	quite	low	that	any	given	veteran	will	
be	able	to	obtain	a	precedential	decision	where	their	legal	position	was	
thoroughly	 briefed,	 argued	 by	 competent	 counsel,	 and	 notice	 of	 that	































few	 precedential	 decisions—fewer	 than	 any	 other	 federal	 appellate	
court.204	 	 Panels	 only	 issue	 published,	 precedential	 decisions	 in	 six	
percent	of	cases	that	proceed	to	a	decision	by	the	court.205		Single	judges	
decide	 the	 other	 ninety-four	 percent	 of	 cases	 and	 issue	 unpublished,	
non-precedential	decision.206	 	The	CAVC	is	constrained	in	its	ability	to	











(Sept.	 30,	 2019),	 https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/b-12/judicial-business/
2019/09/30.		The	CAVC	exceeds	even	the	most	unpublished	circuit,	the	11th	Circuit,	in	
which	93.5%	of	decisions	are	unpublished.		Id.		
	 205	 See	 CAVC	 2020	 REPORT,	 supra	 note	 6,	 at	 2	 (showing	 that	 of	 2,581	 cases	 that	
proceeded	to	a	decision	by	the	court,	2,433	were	decided	by	a	single	judge).	
	 206	 Id.	
	 207	 Id.	at	7–8	(“[E]ach	active	judge	on	the	Court	carries	a	substantial	workload	.	.	.	 .		
Congress	recently	renewed	the	Court’s	temporary	authority	for	nine	active	judges.	The	
Court’s	 current	 workload	 justifies	 making	 the	 temporary	 expansion	 to	 nine	 judges	
permanent.”).	
	 208	 Id.		

















the	 VA	 granted	 him	 a	 100%	disability	 rating	 and	 then	 argued	 to	 the	
Federal	Circuit	that	the	appeal	of	class	certification	was	moot.215	 	The	
Federal	 Circuit	 summarily	 rejected	 that	 argument	 and	 explicitly	 held	
that	a	class	action	claim	does	not	become	moot	even	if	the	VA	resolves	
the	 class	 representative’s	 claim,	 so	 long	 as	 “‘other	 persons	 similarly	
situated	will	continue	to	be	subject	to	the	challenged	conduct.’”216	
Even	 when	 a	 binding	 precedential	 decision	 is	 issued	 to	 an	
individual	veteran,	it	is	by	no	means	guaranteed	that	the	VA	will	adhere	
to	the	decision	and	grant	all	other	veterans	the	benefits	of	a	favorable	































class	 representative	brought	 another	 challenge	 to	 the	VA’s	 actions	 in	
Wolfe	v.	Wilkie,	the	court	recognized	that—despite	having	the	benefit	of	
a	 precedential	 decision	 that	 indisputably	 held	 the	 VA’s	 actions	 to	 be	
unlawful—the	only	recourse	individual	claimants	had	in	the	face	of	such	
intransigence	on	the	part	of	the	VA	was	“[f]ull	exhaustion	of	the	agency	
review	 process,	 followed	 by	 an	 appeal	 to	 [the	 CAVC].”220	 	 Individual	
litigants	 do	 not	 have	 any	 way	 of	 enforcing	 the	 VA’s	 violation	 of	 a	
precedential	 decision	 issued	 to	 another	 veteran	 other	 than	 spending	
years	litigating	the	issue	up	to	the	CAVC	themselves,	whereas	a	member	
of	 a	 class	 who	 is	 successfully	 awarded	 relief	 and	 “suffers	 VA’s	




intransigent	 than	 the	 CAVC	would	 like	 to	 believe.222	 	 The	 VA	 simply	
defied	the	holding	of	the	precedential	decision	issued	to	a	single	litigant	
in	 Staab	 until	 the	 enforcement	 mechanisms	 of	 a	 class	 action	 were	
brought	 to	 bear	 in	Wolfe.223	 	 The	Nehmer	 class,	 who	 entered	 into	 a	
consent	decree	with	the	VA	pursuant	to	a	pre-VJRA	class	action,	has	had	
to	bring	 four	separate	enforcement	motions	 in	district	court	over	 the	















*16	 (Mar.	 29,	 2021)	 (characterizing	 VA	 non-compliance	 as	 “hypothetical”	 and	
“unlikely”).	
	 223	 See	Wolfe	v.	Wilkie,	32	Vet.	App.	11	(2019)	(recognizing	that	the	VA	responded	to	






is	 difficult	 for	 us	 to	 comprehend	 is	 why	 the	 Department	 of	 Veteran	
Affairs,	 having	 entered	 into	 a	 settlement	 agreement	 and	 agreed	 to	 a	
consent	 order	 .	.	.	 continues	 to	 resist	 its	 implementation	 so	
vigorously.”225		Veterans	need	the	robust	enforcement	mechanisms	that	
accompany	 a	 class	 action	 to	 overcome	 this	 type	 of	 “obstructionist	
bureaucratic	opposition”	by	the	VA.226	
Additionally,	 when	 a	 precedential	 decision	 is	 issued	 in	 an	
individual	 case,	 there	 is	no	obligation	on	 the	part	 of	 the	VA	 to	notify	
other	 veterans	 who	 might	 benefit	 from	 that	 decision.227	 	 The	 VA’s	
actions—like	 those	 at	 issue	 in	 Wolfe—further	 complicate	 notice	 of	
precedential	 decisions.	 	 There,	 not	 only	 did	 the	VA	 explicitly	 adopt	 a	
regulation	 that	was	directly	 contrary	 to	 the	binding	precedent	 of	 the	
CAVC,	 but	 it	 also	 began	 “affirmatively	 informing	 veterans”	 that	 they	
were	not	eligible	 for	 the	medical	coverage	that	 the	court	had	decided	
they	 were	 eligible	 for—”[i]n	 other	 words,	 the	 Agency	 was	 telling	
veterans	that	the	law	was	exactly	opposite	to	what	a	Federal	court	had	
held	the	law	to	be.”228		The	court	recognized	that	many	veterans	might	








even	 understand	 the	 significance	 of	 precedential	 decisions	 that	 are	
beneficial	 to	 them.230	 	 One	 of	 the	 factors	 that	motivated	 the	 court	 to	
 
	 224	 See	Nehmer	v.	U.S.	Dep’t	of	Veterans	Affairs,	No.	C	86-06160	WHA,	2020	U.S.	Dist.	
LEXIS	 207458,	 at	 *6	 (N.D.	 Cal.	 Nov.	 5,	 2020)	 (“On	 three	 separate	 occasions	 (four	
including	this	motion),	they	have	had	to	seek	enforcement	of	the	consent	decree	on	a	

























Requiring	 litigants	 to	overcome	a	presumption	against	 certifying	
class	actions	based	on	the	mere	possibility	that	they	could	individually	
obtain	a	precedential	decision	is	not	consistent	with	how	other	federal	



























	 233	 See	 Geraghty,	 445	 U.S.	 at	 403	 (“Although	 the	 named	 representative	 receives	
certain	 benefits	 from	 the	 class	 nature	 of	 the	 action,	 some	 of	which	 are	 regarded	 as	




and	 unrepresented	 parties	 and	 prevent	 them	 from	 having	 to	 come	
before	 the	 court	 themselves	 to	 enforce	 already-issued	 precedential	
judgments.234	
The	class	action	exists	to	correct	the	type	of	problem	that	plagues	
veterans	 benefits	 adjudication—a	 “large	 number	 of	 actions,”	 each	 of	
which	has	“common	question[s]”	that	are	disputed	over	and	over	again	
through	a	“process	of	a	practical	smothering	of	repeated	suits”	which	
“take	 some	 time	and	 [do]	not	always	operate	 fairly.”235	 	 Class	actions	
promote	 access	 to	 justice	 by	 allowing	 for	 the	 collective	 resolution	 of	
claims	 where	 veterans	 cannot	 effectively	 bring	 claims	 and	 enforce	
judgments	 as	 individuals.236	 	 The	 development	 of	 CAVC	 class	 action	
jurisprudence	from	Harrison	and	Lefkowitz	through	Monk	II	and	Skaar	
has	 been	 the	 slow	 recognition	 that	 class	 actions	 are,	 in	 many	 ways,	
“superior	 to	 other	 available	 methods	 for	 fairly	 and	 efficiently	
adjudicating	 the	 controversy”	when	 compared	 to	 the	 challenges	 that	
face	veterans	 in	 taking	advantage	of	 the	vanishingly	 small	number	of	
precedential	decisions	to	come	out	of	the	CAVC.237		Veterans	should	not	
have	 to	 repeatedly	 make	 this	 case	 on	 their	 own	 by	 overcoming	 the	
rebuttable	presumption	in	every	potential	class	action.		And	the	CAVC	







The	 CAVC	 should	 eliminate	 the	 presumption	 against	 the	
certification	of	class	actions	that	is	now	codified	in	U.S.	Vet.	App.	Rule	
22(a)(3).	 	 The	 court’s	 newly	 adopted	 U.S.	 Vet.	 App.	 Rule	 23	 already	
captures	the	 long-standing	prerequisites	of	numerosity,	commonality,	
typicality,	 adequacy	 of	 class	 representatives	 and	 counsel,	 and	
availability	of	appropriate	relief	drawn	from	Rule	23,	whose	adoption	












presumption	 against	 class	 action	 certification	 is	 based	 on	 the	 faulty	
assumption	 that	 veterans	 can	 come	 to	 the	 CAVC	 and	 obtain	 binding,	
enforceable	precedential	decisions	that	spur	the	VA	to	correct	its	errors	
and	 fulfill	 its	 mission	 to	 “care	 for	 [those]	 who	 shall	 have	 borne	 the	
battle.”240	 	Sadly,	that	is	simply	not	the	reality	for	the	vast	majority	of	
veterans.	 	 Rather	 than	 place	 another	 hurdle	 in	 veterans’	 path	 to	
obtaining	benefits,	the	CAVC	should	abandon	the	presumption	against	
the	certification	of	class	actions.		
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